The expression 'history' has various significations with which one view neither the science of history nor even history as an Object, but this same entity itself, not necessarily Objectified among such significations, which this entity is understood as something past may well be the pre-eminent usage. This signification is evinced in the kind of talk in which we say that something or other "already belongs to history". Here 'past' means "no longer present-at-hand", or even "still present-at-hand indeed, but without having any 'effect' on the 'Present' ". Of course, the historical as that which is past has also the opposite signification, when we say, "One cannot get away from history." Here, by "history", we have in view that which is past, but which nevertheless is still having effects. Howsoever, the historical, as that which is past, is understood to be related to the 'Present' in the sense of what is actual 'now' and 'today', and to be related to it, either positively or privatively, in such a way as to have effects upon it. Thus 'the past' has a unique double meaning; the past belongs irretrievably to an earlier time; it belonged to the events of that time; and despite that, it can still be present-at-hand 'now'-for instance, the remains of a Greek temple. With the temple, a 'bit of the past' is still 'in the present'.
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Nevertheless, what does it mean to 'summon one to Being-guilty'? The meaning of "summon" is temporality. We have shown that the authentic meaning of this term is temporality. In our further analysis, we shall make this even more clear. Nevertheless, we may venture a projection of the ontological genesis of the sense of "Being-guilty" in general. <|endoftext|> Our next aim is to find the right position for attacking the primordial question of the essence of history-that is to say, for construing historicality existentially. This position is designated by that which is primordially historical. Therefore, we shall begin our study by characterizing what one has in view in using the expressions 'history' and 'historical' in the ordinary interpretation of Dasein. These expressions get used in several ways. <|endoftext|> The most obvious ambiguity of the term 'history' is one that has often been noticed, and there is nothing 'fuzzy' about it. It evinces itself in that this term may mean the 'historical actuality' and the possible science of it. We shall provisionally eliminate the signification of 'history' in the sense of a "science of history" (historiology).
The third concerns are either the notion of euthanasia or the relation of life to the thought of mortality. Some of the most beautiful passages are pleas for a ‘rational’ or ‘free’ death, one that precisely from out of ‘love of life’ does not entirely allow the body to outlive its usefulness and capacity for action. The thought of death should mix a drop of ‘foolishness’ into life, rather than gloom; this is partly because, without the need to come rapidly to a judgement about the significant issues for the sake of one’s eternal soul.
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