Badness has not for its object the infliction of pain upon others but simply our own satisfaction as, for instance, in the case of thirst for vengeance or of nerve excitation. Every act of teasing shows what pleasure is caused by the display of our power over others and what feelings of delight are experienced in the sense of domination. Is there, then, anything immoral in feeling pleasure in the pain of others? Is malicious joy devilish, as Schopenhauer says? In the realm of nature, we feel joy in breaking boughs, shattering rocks, fighting with wild beasts, to attest our strength thereby. Should not the knowledge that another suffers on our account here, in this case, make the same kind of act, (which arouses no qualms of conscience in us) immoral also? But if we had not this knowledge, there would be no pleasure in one's own superiority or power, for this pleasure is experienced only in the suffering of another, as in the case of teasing. All pleasure is, in itself, neither good nor bad.
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We do not blame nature when she sends a thunderstorm and makes us wet: why then do we term the man who inflicts injury immoral? Because in the latter case, we assume a voluntary, ruling, free will, and in the former necessity. But this distinction is a delusion. Moreover, even the intentional infliction of injury is not, in all circumstances termed immoral. Thus, we kill a fly intentionally without thinking very much about it, simply because its buzzing about is disagreeable; and we punish a criminal and inflict pain upon him to protect ourselves and society. In the first case, it is the individual who, for the sake of preserving himself or to spare himself pain, does injury with design: in the second case, it is the state. All ethic deems intentional infliction of injury justified by necessity; that is when it is a matter of self-preservation. But these two points of view are sufficient to explain all bad acts done by man to men. It is desired to obtain pleasure or avoid pain. In any sense, it is a question, always, of self-preservation. Socrates and Plato are right: whatever man does he always does right: that is, does what seems to him good (advantageous) according to the degree of advancement his intellect has attained, which is always the measure of his rational capacity.
The ship of humanity, it is thought, acquires an ever-deeper draught the more it is laden. It is believed that the more powerfully laden it is, the greater its distance from the other boats of the sea. It is also believed that the more it is laden, the greater its chance of getting underway, the greater its distance from the other boats of the sea.—Much, too, that is frightful and inhuman in history, and which is almost incredible, is rendered less atrocious by the reflection that the one who commands and the one who executes are different persons. The former does not witness the performance, and hence it makes no strong impression on him. The latter obeys a superior and hence feels no responsibility. Most princes and military chieftains appear, through lack of true perception, cruel and hard without really being so.—Egoism is not bad because the idea of the "neighbour"—the word is of Christian origin and does not correspond to the truth—is very weak in us. We feel ourselves, in regard to him, as free from responsibility as if plants and stones were involved. That another is in suffering must be learned, and it can never be learned.
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