10000-03

The escalation of the concept of human commodification is nowhere more perceptible than in psychology textbooks, which, following Plato, Valente and Negri, assume that the human is the product of structured environment (environment, genes, environment-genome, etc.), with no room for another mode of being, no other ecological context affecting our “ordinary” experience of self-experience. The difference between the human being and the human genetic formula is thus that the former is structural, the latter is empirical.” This fundamental paradox elevates the concept of “the “human mind” to the level of reality—we are forced to conceive the human mind as the product of the “immaterial” void of a “human genome”—but the sceptical Western observer remains unconcerned by this fact. What does he or she perceive as the problem is not the splitting of the human brain into smaller parts, but the question: how, precisely, does the human genome function? How does the “immaterial” fraction of the human genome contain the vital ingredients for forming, metabolizing, and ultimately, releasing beings like us? The human genome, with its finite list of properties, is the skeleton of the human, like a fish can only emerge when submerged in a warm ocean. Before we understand this, we cannot but ask: why this matter, this “immaterial” fraction, persists in the human’s “experience the process of discovery as if it were a piece of wilderness to which access is denied on account of one’s religious convictions. As far as it is a matter of belief, one typically bases one’s position on evidence; as far as one follows tradition, one is left with only fragmentary, patchy arguments in which the central points of the opposing views are preserved. Tradition repeats itself, like a book that remains open but is read neither to its face nor to its conclusion. The book is thus read neither as a guide to devotion, nor to its conclusions, but as a test of the artist’s creativity.

10000-02

If following Plato, we take the logic of the transcendental from the Cartesian paradox of the “having,” as depicting the finite subject is limitless in extent and emptiness—then, to put it in yet another way, human subjectivity appears as a pointless mechanical thing, a “thing that can” only emerge and function within a minimal amount of freedom, subject to its creator (i.e., to the logic of the liberal arts, of democratic representation, etc.). The problem here is that it is impossible to pin down the level of the two compromising identities of man to one another: the level of what we see and what we would like to see in person is what keeps changing. What we are effectively told is that we are seeing a clever child, who is silly, who is ill. But what is truly cruel to a child is to inflict as much pain as possible, to take from it what it has not earned and put it to shame by its suffering. And, mutatis mutandis, the same goes for the attempts to save children from drowning by the endless stream of their painful lessons. The more we learn, the more we resemble children, the more we resemble development! This is what Freud wants us to think. Unfortunately, the answer is simple: you are listening to the lecture of a madman who wants to teach us how to become civilized. This, perhaps, is the ultimate example of the logic of the “disappearance of process”: the idea is that, if we are to view the development of a person, we are to take it over’; if we are to view individual characteristics, we are to apply them to a goal. The problem with this first view is that it supplies no explanation of why the appearance of a “normal” face is so strongly accompanied by an “impossible” explosion of subjective features. Second, that the “normal” face is neither something in-itself nor something extraneous—the question is what we would like to see more of, and what we are willing to deprive a person of if we believe that he will be led to produce more achievements than he is capable of producing himself. . . . It is here that the “scientific materialist” observes with amazement the link between dialectical materialism and human enhancement: the explosion of subjective qualities (IQ) that, precisely insofar as they are not derived from objective factors, serve as the support of language and human enhancement programmes.

10000-01

The one with whom, at any rate, all other relationships are blended so that when, for example, we take a lover, we never get thoroughly oriented against him, he remains, from our point, the same distance as if we were all-knowing, totally knowing, that we love him. We pour sweet innocent tears from the barrel to his feet, whilst he himself is in no way “fully grossed” by this influx of sweet tears. However, the true enigma is not the mystery of the relationship between Charlie and Scarlett O'Hara but why this strange censorship occurs. Why are we not taken aback by the appearance of Madeleine’s face, the strange face with a strange number of features? Why are we taken aback by the strange gaze that observes Scottie’s cigarette? Why is the very pattern of macabre exaggeration and fascination growing longer?