Now that we have delimited our preliminary conception of phenomenology, the terms’ phenomenal’ and ‘phenomenological’ can also be fixed in their signification. That which is given and explicable in how the phenomenon is encountered is called ‘phenomenal’; this is what we have in mind when we talk about “phenomenal structures”. Everything that belongs to the exhibiting and explicating species and makes up the way of conceiving demanded by this research is called ‘phenomenological’.
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Because phenomena, as understood phenomenologically, are never anything but what goes to make up Being, while Being is in every case the Being of some entity, we must first bring forward the entities themselves if it is our aim that Being should be laid bare; and we must do this in the right way. These entities must likewise show themselves with the kind of access which genuinely belongs to them. And in this way, the ordinary conception of the phenomenon becomes phenomenologically relevant. If our analysis is to be authentic, its aim is such that the primary task of assuring ourselves ‘phenomenologically’ of that entity, which serves as our example, has already been prescribed as our point of departure.
We next have in mind that the term "history" is not so much 'the past' in the sense of that which is past, but rather derivation from such a past. Anything that 'has a history' stands in the context of a becoming. In such becoming, 'development' is sometimes a rise, sometimes a fall. What 'has a history' in -this way can, at the same time, 'make' such history. As 'epoch-making', it determines 'a future' 'in the present'. Here "history" signifies a 'context' of events and 'effects', which draws on through 'the past', the 'Present', and the 'future'. On this view, the past has no special priority. Further, "history" signifies the totality of those entities which change 'in time', and indeed the transformations and vicissitudes of men, of human groupings and their 'cultures', as distinguished from Nature, which likewise operates 'in time'. Here what one has in view is not so much a kind of Being-historizing-as it is that realm of entities which one distinguishes from Nature by having regard for how man's existence is essentially determined by 'spirit' and 'culture', even though in a certain manner Nature too belongs to "history" as thus understood. Finally, whatever has been handed down to us is as such held to be 'historical', whether it is something which we know histologically or something that has been taken over as self-evident, with its derivation hidden.
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