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Badness has not for its object the infliction of pain upon others but simply our own satisfaction as, for instance, in the case of thirst for vengeance or of nerve excitation. Every act of teasing shows what pleasure is caused by the display of our power over others and what feelings of delight are experienced in the sense of domination. Is there, then, anything immoral in feeling pleasure in the pain of others? Is malicious joy devilish, as Schopenhauer says? In the realm of nature, we feel joy in breaking boughs, shattering rocks, fighting with wild beasts, to attest our strength thereby. Should not the knowledge that another suffers on our account here, in this case, make the same kind of act, (which arouses no qualms of conscience in us) immoral also? But if we had not this knowledge, there would be no pleasure in one's own superiority or power, for this pleasure is experienced only in the suffering of another, as in the case of teasing. All pleasure is, in itself, neither good nor bad.